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ABSTRACT
A new task put on the agenda of philosophical logic by the recent dynamic turn, the account for the dynamics
of anaphoric context shifts in reasoning, is taken up. The paper gives a sequent axiomatisation of some well
known dynamic anaphora logics. The calculi are shown to be sound and complete. They dier from earlier
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1. Pronominal Reference in Reasoning
The recent ‘dynamic shift’ in logic has led to an increased awareness for the process character of
aspects of reasoning. One of the new topics on the logical agenda is anaphoric processing: the way
in which possible antecedents for pronominal reference are set up in discourse. As always, awareness
of new facts gives occasion for new challenges. Instead of just giving an account of valid reasoning,
why not include an account of the way in which premisses can set up an ‘anaphoric context’ for use
by pronouns in the conclusion:
1 Every man is mortal. Suppose Socrates is a man. j= Then he is mortal.
2 If a man owns a house, then he owns a garden. Suppose Socrates is a man who owns a house. j=
Then he owns a garden.
3 If a man owns a house, then he owns a garden. If a man owns a garden, then he sprinkles it. j=
If a man owns a house, then there is a thing that he sprinkles.
The task for a suitably dynamicized version of logic is to account for the validity of the above inferences,
and for the pronoun-antecedent linkings in the discourses that make up the reasoning.
2The most streamlined version of recent proposals for a logical representation language for anaphoric
linking is Dynamic Predicate Logic or DPL (Groenendijk and Stokhof [7]), the rst order version of
the representation language proposed in Barwise [1]. This dynamic variation on predicate logic was
discovered more than once or twice, witness the existence of a German version, virtually identical to
[7]: see Staudacher [11].
The dynamic logic of Barwise [1], Staudacher [11] and Groenendijk and Stokhof [7] essentially repre-
sents introduction of new antecedents by means of random assignment to a variable. The meaning of
9x becomes the relation between variable states s; r with the property that s and r dier at most in
their x value:
s[[9x]]r i s x r:
The language L of DPL is like that of predicate logic, but with the connective ^ replaced with a
connective ; for sequential composition. Let a set of constants C and a set of variables V be given,
and assume that c ranges over C and v over V . Also, assume a set of predicate constants P ij , with i
indicating arity, and let P range over this set. We will omit the arity superscripts, and rely on context
to indicate the arity of a predicate.
Denition 1 (L)
t ::= c j v
A ::= ? j 9v j Pt1    tn
 ::= A j A; j :() j :(1);2:
Note that we have built into the language that ; creates a flat list structure. (Alternatively, we
could allow ; ; to be ambiguous between (; ); and ; ( ;), but then we would have to build
associativity of ; into the calculus below.)
We will omit unnecessary parentheses, writing :(Pt1    tn) as :Pt1    tn, etcetera, and we will use
the following abbreviations:
> := :?
1 ! 2 := :(1;:2)
8v := :(9v;:):
The key feature of dynamic predicate logic is the ability of the existential quantier to bind variables
outside its proper scope. Assuming for a moment that ; creates structured lists, consider the DPL
text (9x;Px); (9y;Qy);Rxy. Here the x and y of Rxy are bound, by 9x and 9y respectively, outside
of the ‘proper scope’ of the quantiers, as indicated by the bracketings. It follows that variables can
be viewed as anaphoric elements linked to a preceding existential quantier that introduces a referent.
It is precisely because of the feature that (9x;Px);Qx and 9x; (Px;Qx) are semantically equivalent
that we can get away with considering ; as a flat list constructor.
The semantics of DPL is given as a relation between input and output assignments, given a rst order
model M. We use s v r in case s and r dier at most in the value they assign to v, and s X r
(X  V ) in case s and r dier at most in the values they assign to the variables in X . We use sIXr
if 8x 2 X : s(x) = r(x). Note that sIXr i s (V−X) r.
Denition 2 ( Term evaluation for L)
[[c]]Ms = c
M
[[v]]Ms = s(v):
3Denition 3 (Semantics of L)
s[[?]]Mr never
s[[9v]]Mr i s v r
s[[Pt1    tn]]Mr i s = r and h[[t1]]Ms ; : : : ; [[tn]]Ms i 2 PM
s[[:()]]Mr i s = r and there is no s0 with s[[]]Ms0
s[[A;]]Mr i there is an s0 with s[[A]]Ms0 and s0[[]]Mr
s[[:(1);2]]Mr i s[[:1]]Ms and s[[2]]Mr:
Note that in this semantics for DPL, a repeated assignment to a single variable by means of a repeated
use of the same existential quantier-variable combination blocks o the individual introduced by the
rst use of the quantier from further anaphoric reference. After 9xPx; 9xQx, the variable x will refer
to the individual introduced by 9xQx, and the individual introduced by 9xPx has become inaccessible.
A suitable consequence relation for this language is the following:
Denition 4  j=  :() for all M; s; t: if s[[]]Mt then there is an r with t[[ ]]Mr.
Note that this consequence relation allows carrying anaphoric links from premiss to conclusion. For
example: from ‘a man walks and he talks’ it follows that ‘he talks’:
9x;Mx;Wx;Tx j= Tx:
A DPL formula  succeeds in a state s for model M in case for some r, s[[]]Mr. The weakest
precondition for success of a DPL formula  gives what can be called the truth condition for that
formula; it can be described as hi>, where hi is a ‘modal’ operator interpreted with accessibility
relation [[]].
The following translation procedure in a language of classical predicate logic with DPL modalities
constitutes the full precondition calculus for DPL:
h?i $ ?
h9vi $ 9v
hPt1    tni $ Pt1    tn ^ 
h: i $ [ ]? ^ 
h 1; 2i $ h 1ih 2i:
This reduction to classical predicate logic provides a kind of translation ‘in the context of a given
postcondition’. Without the postcondition context, the translation procedure would break down for
the existential quantier case, for 9v per se has no counterpart in classical predicate logic, of course.
The translation is in the spirit of systems of precondition reasoning for imperative programs. See
Van Eijck and De Vries [4] for further discussion of this connection. Such a calculus has its use for
reasoning about DPL, but although it has been sold to the general public as an axiomatisation of
DPL (in Van Eijck [3]), it is closer to a translation procedure than to a real axiomatisation.
2. Substitution in DPL
In the calculus we are about to present, we need some notions about freedom and bondage. First of
all, we need the notion of being freely substitutable. For this, we rst dene a function var on the
terms and formulas.
4Denition 5 (var(t); var())
var(c) := ;
var(v) := fvg
var(?) := ;
var(9v) := fvg
var(Pt1    tn) :=
S
1in var(ti)
var(:) := var()
var(?;) := var()
var(9v;) := fvg [ var()
var(Pt1    tn;) := var(Pt1    tn) [ var()
var(:1;2) := var(1) [ var(2):
Denition 6 (t is free for v in ) 1. t is free for v in A.
2. t is free for v in (: ) if t is free for v in  .
3. t is free for v in ?; if t is free for v in  .
4. t is free for v in 9v; .
5. t is free for v in 9w; (w 6= v) if w =2 var(t) and t is free for v in  .
6. t is free for v in Pt1    tn; if t is free for v in  .
7. t is free for v in (: 1); 2 if t is free for v in  1 and t is free for v in  2.
The set of variables which have a xed occurrence in a DPL formula is given by a function x : L! PV .
The set of variables which are introduced in a formula is given by a function intro : L ! PV , and
the set of variables which have a classically bound occurrence in a formula is given by a function
cbnd : L! PV .
Denition 7 (x, intro, cbnd)  x(9v) := ;, intro(9v) := fvg, cbnd(9v) := ;.
 x(?) := ;, intro(?) := ;, cbnd(?) := ;.
 x(Pt1    tn) := var(Pt1    tn), intro(Pt1    tn) := ;, cbnd(Pt1    tn) := ;.
 x(:) := x(), intro(:) := ;, cbnd(:) := intro() [ cbnd().
 x(1;2) := x(1) [ (x(2)− intro(1)),
intro(1;2) := intro(1) [ intro(2),
cbnd(1;2) := cbnd(1) [ cbnd(2).
We call an occurrence of v in  free if it is not introduced and not classically bound, and we use [t=v]
for the result of substituting t for all free occurrences of v in :
5Denition 8 ([t=v])
[t=v]c := c
[t=v]v := t
[t=v]w := w
[t=v]? := ?
[t=v]9v := 9v
[t=v]9w := 9w
[t=v]Pt1    tn := P [t=v]t1    [t=v]tn
[t=v]: := :[t=v]
[t=v](?;) := ?; [t=v]
[t=v](9v;) := 9v;
[t=v](9w;) := 9w; [t=v]
[t=v](Pt1    tn;) := P [t=v]t1    [t=v]tn; [t=v]
[t=v](:1;2) := :([t=v]1); [t=v]2:
Note that this substitution takes the dynamic binding force of 9v over the text that follows into
account (cf. the clause for [t=v](9v;), where the occurrence of 9v blocks o the  that follows).
Visser [14] calls this substitution ‘left’ substitution.
We use s[v := a] for the function s0 dened by s0(w) = s(w) if w 6= v, s0(w) = a if w = v.
Lemma 9 (Term Substitution)
[[[t1=v]t2]]Ms = [[t2]]
M
s[v:=[[t1]]Ms ]
:
Proof. In case t2 is not a variable, [t1=v]t2 equals t2, and the lemma trivially holds.
If t2 = w 6= v, [t1=v]t2 equals t2, and the lemma trivially holds.
If t2 = v, [t1=v]t2 equals t1, and the lemma holds because [[t1]]Ms = s[v := [[t1]]
M
s ](v). 2
The following formula substitution lemma makes clear that substitution in dynamic predicate logic
behaves dierently from substitution in standard predicate logic. When substituting into , we have
to take the context of  (in the form of the set of variables given by intro()) into account. For further
elaboration of this theme we refer to Visser [14].
Lemma 10 (Formula Substitution) If t is free for v in  and v 2 intro() then
s[[[t=v]]]Mr, s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[]]Mr:
If t is free for v in  and v =2 intro() then
s[[[t=v]]]Mr, s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[]]Mr[v := [[t]]Ms ]:
Proof. Induction on the structure of .
 = ?. OK.
 = 9v. Then v 2 intro(), and
s[[[t=v]9v]]Mr
() s[[9v]]Mr
() s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[9v]]Mr:
6 = 9w, with w 6= v. Now v =2 intro(), and
s[[[t=v]9w]]Mr
() s[[9w]]Mr
() s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[9w]]Mr[v := [[t]]Ms ]:
 = Pt1    tn. Then v =2 intro(), and
s[[[t=v]Pt1    tn]]Ms
() h[[[t=v]t1]]Ms ; : : : ; [[[t=v]tn]]Ms i 2 PM
() h[[t1]]Ms[v:=[[t]]Ms ]; : : : ; [[tn]]
M
s[v:=[[t]]Ms ]
i 2 PM
() s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[Pt1    tn]]Ms[v := [[t]]Ms ]:
 = : . Then v =2 intro() and
s[[[v=t]: ]]Ms
() s[[:[v=t] ]]Ms
() there is no s0 with s[[[v=t] ]]Ms0
() there is no s0 with s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[ ]]Ms0
() s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[: ]]Ms[v := [[t]]Ms ]:
Note that the last step uses the induction hypothesis, and that the appeal to the induction hypothesis
works out equally well for the two subcases v 2 intro( ) and v =2 intro( ).
 = A; .
Subcase 1: A = ?. OK.
Subcase 2: A = 9v. Then v 2 intro(), and
s[[[t=v]9v; ]]Mr
() s[[9v; ]]Mr
() s v s0 and s0[[ ]]Mr
() s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[9v; ]]Mr:
Subcase 3: A = 9w, with w 6= v. Then v =2 intro() and
s[[[t=v](9w; )]]Mr
() s[[9w; [t=v] ]]Mr
() s w s0 and s0[[[t=v] ]]Mr
() s w s0 and s0[v := [[t]]Ms ][[ ]]Mr[v := [[t]]Ms ]
() s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[9w; ]]Mr[v := [[t]]Ms ]
 = (: 1); 2. Here is the case where v 2 intro( 2).
s[[[t=v](:( 1); 2)]]Mr
() s[[:([t=v] 1); [t=v] 2)]]Mr
() s[[:([t=v] 1)]]Ms and s[[[t=v] 2)]]Mr
() s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[ 1]]s[v := [[t]]Ms ] and s[v := [[t]]Ms ][[ 2]]Mr:
The case where v =2 intro( 2) is similar. 2
The following lemmas use the functions intro and x (and indeed motivate their denition).
Lemma 11 s[[]]Mt implies s intro() t.
7Proof. Induction on the structure of . 2
Lemma 12 If s[[]]Ms0 and sIXr for X  x() then there is an r0 with r[[]]Mr0.
Proof. Induction on the structure of .
?: trivial.
9v. Take r0 = r[v := s0(v)].
Pt1    tn. Use the fact that h[[t1]]Ms    [[tn]]Ms i = h[[t1]]Mr    [[tn]]Mr i.
(: ). From :9s0 : s[[ ]]Ms0 it follows by induction hypothesis that :9r0 : r[[ ]]Mr0. Therefore
r[[: ]]Mr.
?; . Trivial.
9v; . Then s[[9v; ]]Ms0, and there is an s00 with s v s00 and s00[[ ]]Ms0. Take r00 = r[v := s00(v)].
Then, by the induction hypothesis, there is an r0 with r00[[ ]]Mr0, and therefore r[[9v; ]]Mr0.
Pt1    tn; . Then we have s[[Pt1    tn; ]]Ms0 i s[[Pt1    tn]]Ms and s[[ ]]Ms0 i r[[Pt1    tn]]Mr (by
the fact that sIvar(Pt1tn)r) and r[[ ]]
Mr0 for some r0 (by i.h.) i r[[Pt1    tn; ]]Mr0.
(:1);2. Then s[[(: 1); 2]]Ms0 i s[[: 1]]Ms and s[[ 2]]Ms0. By the induction hypothesis r[[: 1]]Mr.
and by a second application of the induction hypothesis there is an r0 with r[[ 2]]Mr0. Thus, there is
an r0 with r[[: 1; 2]]Mr0. 2
3. A Calculus for DPL
In this section, we will give a set of sequent deduction rules for DPL. We will use  =)  , where =)
is the sequent separator. Note that  =) ? expresses that  is inconsistent. The calculus denes a
relation =) L2 by means of:  =)  i  =)  is at the root of a nite tree with sequents at
its nodes, such that the sequents at a leaf node are axioms of the calculus, and the sequents at the
internal nodes follow by means of a rule of the calculus from the sequent(s) at the daughter node(s)
of that internal node.
In the calculus, we use C, with and without subscripts, as a variable over contexts, where a context
is a formula or the empty list . Substitution and evaluation are extended to contexts in the obvious
way. If C is a context and  a formula, then we use C for the formula given by: C :=  if C = ,
C :=  ; if C =  . Similarly for C, and for C1C2.
It is convenient to extend the denition of substitution to sequents.
Denition 13 ([t=v]C =) ) Induction on the structure of C
[t=v] =)  :=  =) [t=v]
[t=v] =)  :=

([t=v] ) =)  if v 2 intro( )
([t=v] ) =) ([t=v]) otherwise.
Substitution for sequents carries in its wake a notion of being free for a variable in a sequent:
Denition 14 (t is free for v in C =)  ) 1. t is free for v in  =)  if t is free for v in  .
2. t is free for v in  =)  if t is free for v in , and either v 2 intro() or t is free for v in  .
8Figure 1: The Calculus for DPL
test axiom T =) T
transitivity
 =)   =) 
 =)  intro( ) \ x() = ;
test contraction
C1T ;TC2 =) 
C1TC2 =) 
 =) C1T ;TC2
 =) C1TC2
quantier contraction
C19v; 9v C2 =) 
C19v C2 =) 
 =) C19v; 9v C2
 =) C19v C2
test swap
C1T1;T2C2 =) 
C1T2;T1C2 =) 
 =) C1T1;T2C2
 =) C1T2;T1C2
quantier swap
C19v; 9wC2 =) 
C19w; 9vC2 =) 
 =) C19v; 9wC2
 =) C19w; 9vC2
test-quantier swap
C1T ; 9v C2 =) 
C19v;TC2 =)  v =2 x(T )
 =) C1T ; 9v C2
 =) C19v;TC2 v =2 x(T )
quantier-test swap
C19v;TC2 =) 
C1T ; 9v C2 =)  v =2 x(T )
 =) C19v;TC2
 =) C1T ; 9v C2 v =2 x(T )
quantier intro
 =) [t=v] 
 =) 9v; 
var refreshment
C19v C2 =) 
C19w[w=v]C2 =)  w =2 intro(C1) [ x(C1)
sequencing
 =) 
; =) 
 =)   =) 
 =)  ; intro( ) \ x() = ;
negation
 =)  
;: =) ?
; =) ?
 =) : 
double negation
 =) :: 
 =)  
;:: =) ?
; =) ?
9When a rule mentions a substitution [t=v] in the consequent of a sequent then the standard assump-
tion is made hat t is free for v in . Note that in the rules below, =) binds more strongly than
[t=v].When a rule mentions a substitution C1[t=v]C2 =)  then it is assumed that t is free for v in
C2 =) .
In the rules below we will use T as an abbreviation of formulas  with intro() = ; (T for Test
formula).
Structural Rules
Test Axiom
T =) T
Soundness of Test Axiom If s[[T ]]Mt then s = t (because T is a test) and thus there is an r with
t[[T ]]Mr, namely r = s. Thus, T j= T .
Transitivity Rule
 =)   =) 
 =)  intro( ) \ x() = ;
In case the side condition is not fullled, this can always be remedied by one or more applications of
9 right (see below). Note that in the case where the ‘cut’ formula is a test the side condition of the
rule is always fullled, and the rule assumes the familiar format:
 =) T T =) 
 =) 
Here is an example application:
Rxy =) Ryx Ryx =) 9z;Ryz
Rxy =) 9z;Ryz trans
Soundness of Transitivity Rule Suppose  j=  and  j= . Assume s[[]]Mt. Then by  j=  , there
is an r with t[[ ]]Mr. By  j= , there is a u with r[[]]Mu. Then by Lemma 11, t intro( ) r. By
the fact that intro( ) \ x() = ;, tIx()r. By tIx()r, r[[]]Mu and Lemma 12 there is an u0 with
t[[]]Mu0. Thus,  j= .
Weakening Rules Due to the format where ; serves as the concatenation operator for formulas, the
rule for ; left does double duty as an antecedent weakening rule. See below. Succedent weakening
would be the step from  =)  to  =) :(: ;:). This is taken care of by the negation rules.
Again: see below.
Test Contraction Rules
C1T ;TC2 =) 
C1TC2 =) 
 =) C1T ;TC2
 =) C1TC2
Note that contraction does not generally hold for formulas which are not tests. For instance,
Px; 9x;Qx;Px; 9x;Qx
demands that the interpretations of P and Q in a model have a non-empty intersection, while
Px; 9x;Qx may be satised in models where this is not the case.
10
Soundness of Test Contraction Rules Immediate from the fact that if intro() = ; then s[[]]Mt i
s = t.
Quantier Contraction Rules
C19v; 9v C2 =) 
C19v C2 =) 
 =) C19v; 9v C2
 =) C19v C2
Soundness of Quantier Contraction Immediate from the fact that v is transitive.
Test Swap Rules
C1T1;T2C2 =) 
C1T2;T1C2 =) 
 =) C1T1;T2C2
 =) C1T2;T1C2
Soundness of Test Swap Rules Follows from the fact that s[[T1;T2]]Mt i s[[T2;T1]]Mt.
Quantier Swap Rules
C19v; 9wC2 =) 
C19w; 9vC2 =) 
 =) C19v; 9wC2
 =) C19w; 9vC2
Soundness of Quantier Swap Rules Follows from the fact that s[[9v; 9w]]Mt i s fv;wg t i
s[[9w; 9v]]Mt.
Quantier Movement Rules
C1T ; 9v C2 =) 
C19v;TC2 =)  v =2 x(T )
 =) C1T ; 9v C2
 =) C19v;TC2 v =2 x(T )
C19v;TC2 =) 
C1T ; 9v C2 =)  v =2 x(T )
 =) C19v;TC2
 =) C1T ; 9v C2 v =2 x(T )
These rules allow us to pull 9v through a test T . To avoid accidental capture of variables, the condition
has to be fullled that 9v does not bind anything in T , in other words, that v =2 x(T ).
Soundness of Quantier Movement Rules The crucial observation is that for a test T with v =2 x(T )
we have that for all models M, [[9v;T ]]M = [[T ; 9v]]M.
9 Left This is a special case of ; left. See below.
9 Right
 =) [t=v] 
 =) 9v; 
Note that it is assumed that t is free for v in  . This assumption qis familiar from the Gentzen format
of 9-right in standard predicate logic. Here is an example application:
Rxx =) Rxx
Rxx =) 9y;Rxy
Rxx equals [x=y]Rxy, so this is indeed a correct application of the rule.
11
Soundness of 9 Right Assume s[[]]Ms1. Then by the soundness of the premiss there is an s2 with
s1[[[t=v] ]]Ms2:
Assume v =2 intro( ). Then by the substitution lemma,
s1[v := [[t]]Ms1 ][[ ]]
Ms2;
and thus there is an r with s1 v r and r[[ ]]Ms2. Assume v 2 intro( ). Then by the substitution
lemma,
s1[v := [[t]]Ms1 ][[ ]]
Ms2[v := [[t]]Ms1 ];
and thus there is an r with s1 v r and r[[ ]]Ms2[v := [[t]]Ms1 ]. In both cases there is a t with
s1[[9v; ]]Mt. This establishes  j= 9v; .
Variable Refreshment Rule
C19v C2 =) 
C19w[w=v]C2 =)  w =2 intro(C1) [ x(C1)
Variable refreshment allows the liberation of a captured variable, e.g., of the rst two occurrences of
x in 9x;Px; 9x;Qx, by means of replacement by a variable that does not occur as an introduced or
active variable in the left context in the given sequent:
9x;Px; 9x;Qx =) Qx
9y;Py; 9x;Qx =) Qx
It is also possible to change the other occurrences of x in the same example. The following is also a
correct application of the rule:
9x;Px; 9x;Qx =) Qx
9x;Px; 9y;Qy =) Qy
Note that the rule can also be used to recycle a variable:
9y;Py; 9x;Qx =) Qx
9x;Px; 9x;Qx =) Qx
This application is also correct, for
(9x;Px; 9x;Qx =) Qx) = (9x; [x=y]Py; 9x;Qx =) Qx):
Soundness of Variable Refreshment Assume s[[C19w[w=v]C2]]Mr. Then there are s1; s2 with
s[[C1]]Ms1; s1 w s2; s2[[[w=v]C2]]Mr:
Let s0 := s[w := s2(w)] and s01 := s1[w := s2(w)]. Because w =2 intro(C1) and w =2 x(C1), we
get by Lemmas 11 and 12 that s0[[C1]]Ms01. From s1 w s2 we get that s01 = s2, and therefore
s01 v s2[v := s2(w)]. Suppose v 2 intro(C2). Then by Lemma 10, s2[v := s2(w)][[C2]]Mr. Therefore
s0[[C19v C1]]Mr. By the soundness of the premiss it follows from s0[[C19vC1]]Mr that there is a t with
r[[]]Mt. This establishes C19w; [w=v]C2 j= . Suppose on the other hand that v =2 intro(C2). Then
the substitution lemma yields that s2[v := s2(w)][[C2]]Mr[v := s2(w)]. Therefore s0[[C19v C1]]Mr[v :=
s2(w)]. By the soundness of the premiss it follows from s0[[C19vC1]]Mr[v := s2(w)] that there is a
t with r[v := s2(w)][[]]Mt. By another application of the substitution lemma we get from this that
there is a t0 with r[[[w=v]]]Mt0. This establishes C19w; [w=v]C2 j= [w=v].
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; Left and Right
 =) 
; =) 
 =)   =) 
 =)  ; intro( ) \ x() = ;
The rst of these does double duty as a left weakening rule. Antecedent weakening is always extension
on the lefthand side. This is because extension on the righthand-side might introduce new variable
bindings that extend to the consequent. Weakening with a test is valid anywhere in the antecedent;
the swap rules account for that.
An example application of the rule for ; right is:
Rxx =) 9y;Ryx Rxx =) 9z;Rxz
Rxx =) 9y;Ryx; 9z;Rxz ; right
In case the condition on the rule for ; right is not satised, e.g. for the two sequents :Px; 9x;Px =)
9x;:Px and :Px; 9x;Px =) Px, this can always be remedied by one or more applications of 9 Right
to the second premiss.
Soundness of ; Left Suppose s[[; ]]Mt. Then there is an s0 with s[[]]Ms0 and s0[[ ]]Mt. From
s0[[ ]]Mt and the soundness of the premiss it follows that there is an r with t[[]]Mr. This proves that
; j= .
Soundness of ; Right Assume s[[]]Mt. By the soundness of the rst premiss, there is an r with
t[[ ]]Mr. By the soundness of the second premiss, there is an r0 with t[[]]Mr0.
From t[[ ]]Mr we get by Lemma 11 that t intro( ) r and from the fact that intro( ) \ x() = ;
we may conclude, by Lemma 12, that there is an r00 with r[[]]Mr00, and we have established that
 j=  ;.
: Left and Right
 =)  
;: =)?
; =) ?
 =) : 
Soundness of : Left Assume s[[;: ]]Mt. Then s[[]]Mt and there is no r with t[[ ]]Mr. Contradiction
with the soundness of the premiss. This establishes ;: j= ?.
Soundness of : Right Assume s[[]]Mt. Then by the soundness of the premiss, there is no r with
t[[ ]]Mr. This establishes  j= : .
Double Negation Rules
 =) :: 
 =)  
;:: =) ?
; =) ?
Soundness of Double Negation Rules For Double Negation Left, assume s[[]]Mt. Then by the sound-
ness of the premiss, there is no r with t[[: ]]Mr. By the fact that : is a test, this means that it
is not the case that t[[: ]]Mt. But then there is an r with t[[ ]]Mr. This establishes  j=  . The
soundness of Double Negation Right is established similarly.
This completes the presentation of the calculus. As we have checked the soundness of every rule as
we went along, we have:
Theorem 15 The Calculus for DPL is sound.
Proof. Induction on the structure of a proof tree for  =)  . 2
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4. Derivable Rules for DPL Reasoning
Proposition 16 (Contradiction Rule) The following rule is derivable:
;: =) : ;: =) 
 =)  
Proof. Here is a derivation:
;: =) : ;: =) 
;: =) :; ; r
: =) : test axiom
:;:: =)? :l
:; =) ? dn
;: =) ? tr
 =) :: :r
 =)  dn
2
Proposition 17 (Cases Rule) The following rule is derivable:
;: =)  ;:: =) 
 =) 
Proof. Here is a derivation:
;: =) 
;: ;: =)? :l
;:;: =)? swap
;: =) :: :r
;:: =) 
;:: ;: =) ? :l
;:;:: =) ? swap
;: =) ::: :r
 =)  contrad
2
5. Completeness of the Calculus
To establish the completeness of the calculus, assume that  6=)  . We will construct a countermodel
by a slight modication of the standard Henkin construction for the completeness of classical predicate
logic.
Denition 18  ‘Γ  :, there are 1; : : : ; n 2 Γ with ;::1;    ;::n =)  . We say that Γ
is consistent with  if there is a  with  6‘Γ  .
We call Γ negation complete with respect to  if for every  either  ‘Γ  or  ‘Γ : .
Call a formula  xed in v if v 2 x( ). Γ has witnesses for  if for every formula  xed in v such
that  ‘Γ 9v; there is a c for which ::(9v; )! [c=v] 2 Γ.
Note that in the denition of  ‘Γ  the extra premisses from Γ do not extend the ‘anaphoric context’:
the context change potential of the premisses from Γ is blocked o by means of double negation signs.
This is a key element in the canonical model construction below.
Proposition 19 If  6‘Γ  then at least one of Γ [ f g, Γ [ f: g is consistent with .
Proof. Use the Cases Rule. 2
Let 1; : : : be a list of all formulas of L that are xed in v. Let C0 := c01; : : : be a list of fresh individual
constants. Let L0 be L(C0) (the result of adding the constants C0 to L.
0 := f::(9v;i)! [c0i =v]i j 1  ig:
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Let m1 ; : : : be a list of all formulas that are xed in v which occur in Lm. Let Cm+1 := c
m+1
1 ; : : : be
a list of fresh individual constants. Let Lm+1 := Lm(Cm+1).
m+1 := f::(9v;m+1i )! [cm+1i =v]m+1i j 1  ig:
Let C :=
S
m Cm, and let  be the set of L(C) formulas given by:
 :=
[
m
m:
Proposition 20 If Γ consists of L(C) formulas, and Γ  , then Γ has witnesses for .
Proof. Take some  xed in v with  ‘Γ 9v; . Then  2 Lm for some m. So there is some c 2 C
with ::(9v; )! [c=v] 2 m+1. So ::(9v; )! [c=v] ) 2   Γ. 2
Proposition 21 If Γ is consistent with  then there is a Γ0  Γ which is consistent with , negation
complete with respect to , and has witnesses for .
Proof. Assume Γ consistent with . Let 1; : : : ; i; : : : be an enumeration of all bounded formulas
of the language L(C). Extend Γ as follows to a Γ0 with the required properties.
Γ0 := Γ [
Γm+1 :=

Γm [ fmg) if Γm [ fmg) consistent with ;
Γm otherwise.
Γ0 :=
[
m
Γm
Γ0  , so by Proposition 20 Γ0 has witnesses for .
Assume Γ0 is inconsistent with . Then some Γm has to be inconsistent with  and contradiction with
Proposition 19. So Γ0 is consistent with .
Finally, Γ0 is negation complete by construction. 2
Denition 22 (Canonical Model) Let Γ be consistent with , be negation complete with respect to
, and have witnesses for . Then MΓ = (D; I) is dened as follows. D := the set of variables V
together with the set of constants C occurring in Γ [ fg. For all terms of the language, let I(t) := t.
Let I(P ) := fht1; : : : tki j  ‘Γ P (t1; : : : ; tk)g.
Lemma 23 (Satisfaction Lemma) Let Γ be consistent with , be negation complete with respect
to , and have witnesses for . Then for all :  ‘Γ  i 9t with i[[]]MΓt, where i is the identity
assignment.
Proof. Induction on the structure of .
 6‘Γ ? by the fact that  is consistent and Γ is consistent with .
 ‘Γ Pt1    tn i h[[t1]]MΓi ; : : : ; [[tn]]MΓi i 2 I(P ) i i[[Pt1    tn]]MΓi.
 ‘Γ :0 i (Γ negation complete)  6‘Γ 0 i (i.h.) there is no t with i[[0]]MΓt i (semantic clause for
:) i[[:0]]MΓi.
 6‘Γ ?; 0, for assume the contrary. The following proof tree establishes that ?; 0 =) ?:
? =)? test axiom
0;? =) ? ; left
?; 0 =) ? test swaps
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Thus, from  ‘Γ ?; 0 and ?; 0 =)? we get by transitivity that  ‘Γ ?, and contradiction with the
facts that  is consistent and that Γ is consistent with .
 ‘Γ Pt1    tn; 0 i  ‘Γ Pt1    tn and  ‘Γ 0 i h[[t1]]MΓi ; : : : ; [[tn]]MΓi i 2 I(P ) and  ‘Γ 0 i
i[[Pt1    tn]]MΓi and (i.h.) there is a t with i[[0]]MΓt i there is a t with i[[Pt1    tn; 0]]MΓt.
 ‘Γ 9v; 0 i (Γ has witnesses)  ‘Γ [c=v]0 i (i.h.) there is a t with i[[[c=v]0]]MΓt i i[[9v; 0]]MΓt.
 ‘Γ :1; 2 i  ‘Γ :1 and  ‘Γ 2 i (i.h. twice) i[[:1]]MΓi and there is a t with i[[2]]MΓt i there
is a t with i[[:1; 2]]MΓt.
2
Proposition 24 Let Γ be consistent with , be negation complete with respect to , and have witnesses
for . Then i[[]]MΓ i.
Proof. Let 1 be 9w1;    ; 9wn;, where fw1; : : : ; wng = x(). Next, let 2 be the result
of applying the rst variable refreshment rule to 1 as many times as necessary to ensure that all
patterns of the form 9v; ; 9v in 1 are replaced by patterns 9w; [w=v] ; 9v. Note that application
of the rst variable refreshment rule does not aect the set of introduced variables. Finally, let
9v1;    ; 9vk;0 be the result of moving all quantiers of 2 to the front. This is possible, as the
conditions for pulling the quantiers through tests on their lefthand sides are fullled in 2. Because
no introduced variables of 1 were removed, we have that
fw1; : : : ; wng  fv1; : : : ; vkg;
or in other words,
x()  fv1; : : : ; vkg:
Let fu1; : : : ; umg be the result of removing the set x() from fv1; : : : ; vkg.
Then 9u1;    ; 9um;0 is semantically equivalent to . Moreover, 0 is a test, and we have:
0 =) 0 test axiom
9u1;    ;um;0 =) 0 ; left
 =) 0 quantier swaps + variable refreshments
Therefore,  ‘Γ 0, and we get from the satisfaction lemma, plus the fact that 0 is a test, that
i[[0]]MΓi. Also, by denition of the semantics for 9v, we have that i[[9u1;    ;um]]MΓi. By the
semantic equivalence of  and 9u1;    ; 9um;0 we get i[[]]MΓ i. 2
Theorem 25 (Completeness) If  j=  then  =)  .
Proof. Assume  6=)  . Then : is consistent with . By proposition 21, there is a Γ  f: g
which is consistent with , is negation complete with respect to , and has witnesses for . Construct
the canonical model and apply the satisfaction lemma to get:
i[[: ]]MΓi:
By the semantic clause for negation we have that for all t:
not i[[ ]]MΓt:
By proposition 24:
i[[]]MΓi:
This proves  6j=  . 2
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6. Anaphoric Reasoning with Equality
Anaphoric linking makes extensive use of equality. See Van Eijck [2] for an in-depth analysis of the use
of equality in anaphoric descriptions. An anaphoric denite description like the garden can be treated
as a deniteness quantier followed by a link to a contextually available referent. The translation of He
sprinkles the garden would then be something like x : (x := y;Gx);Szx. Also, the determiner another
often has an implicit anaphoric element. In such cases, the treatment involves non-identity links to
contextually available referents. He met another woman gets a translation like 9x;x 6= y;Wx;Mzx).
Below we indicate briefly how to handle equality, while leaving the axiomatisation of deniteness in
the present framework for another occasion.
For the treatment of equality, add expressions t1
:= t2 to the language (we assume that t1 6= t2 is an
abbreviation of :(t1 := t2)). Equalities are tests, or, in other words, intro(t1 := t2) = ;. The semantics
of equality is as you would expect:
s[[t1
:= t2]]Mr i s = r and [[t1]]Ms equals [[t2]]
M
s :
The following rules must be added to the calculus to deal with equality statements:
Reflexivity Axiom
 =) t := t
Soundness of Reflexivity Axiom The axiom expresses that equality is reflexive.
Substitution Rule For this we need the notion [t1=t2] of substitution of terms for arbitrary terms.
This is dened in the obvious way.
 =) [t1=t2] 
; t1
:= t2 =)  t1; t2 2 C [ intro()
Soundness of the Substitution Rule Assume s[[; t1
:= t2]]Mr. Then s[[]]Mr, and [[t1]]Mr = [[t2]]
M
r . By
the soundness of the premiss, there is an r0 with r[[[t1=t2] ]]Mr0. Therefore, r[[ ]]Mr0. This shows
; t1
:= t2 j=  .
The completeness of the anaphoric DPL calculus with equality is proved by modifying the Henkin
construction in the usual way (taking equivalence classes of terms under provable equality as elements
of the canonical model).
7. A Variation on the Theme
To justify the plural in the title of this paper, rst note that the approach to axiomatising dynamic
predicate logic carries over without a hitch to the analysis of Discourse Representation Theory [8, 5].
The version for DRT looks even more elegant because the shift rules are absorbed by the set theoretic
notation for DRSs. This reflects the fact that the syntax of DRT is more abstract than that of DPL.
To keep as close as possible to the previous calculus, we consider a version of DRT where DRS negation
is primitive and D1 ) D2 is dened in terms of negation. We can view a Discourse Representation
Structure or DRS as a triple consisting of a set of xed referents F , a set of introduced referents I,
and a set of conditions C1   Cn constrained by the requirement that the free variables in the Ci must
be among F [ I.
Concretely, the syntax of DRT looks like this:
Denition 26 (DRT)
t ::= c j v
C ::= ? j Pt1    tn j :D
D ::=
v1    vn vn+1    vm
C1   Ck
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Figure 2: The Calculus for DRT
test axiom
F ;
C
=) F ;
C
M(C)  F
transitivity
D =) F ;
C1
F ;
C1
=) F I
C2
D =) F I
C2
marker intro
D =) F I
[t=v] C
D =) F fvg [ I
C
v =2 F
marker shift
F I
C
=) D
F − I0 I0 [ I
C
=) D
sequencing-l
F I
C
=) D
F I
C0 [ C =) D
M(C0)  F [ I
sequencing-r
D =) F I1
C1
D =) F I2
C2
D =) F I1 [ I2
C1 [ C2
I1 \ I2 = ;
negation
F I
C
=) D
F I
C [ f:Dg =)?
F I1 [ I2
C1 [C2 =) ?
F I1
C1
=)
F [ I1 ;
: F [ I1 I2
C2
M(C1) \ I2 = ;
d-negation
D =)
F ;
:
F ;
: F I
C
D =) F I
C
F I1
C1 [ f:
F [ I1 ;
: F [ I1 I2
C2
g =) ?
F I1 [ I2
C1 [ C2 =) ?
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The (active) markers of a condition C or DRS D are given by:
M(v) := fvg;M(c) := ;;M(Pt1    tn) := [iM(ti);
M(
F I
C
) := F [ I;M(: F I
C
) := F:
Conditions on the formation rule for a DRS
v1    vn vn+1    vm
C1   Ck :
1. fv1    vng \ fvn+1    vmg = ;,
2. [iM(Ci)  fv1    vmg.
We can now dene the condition
F I
C1   Cn ) D
as
: F I
C1   Cn;:D :
Here is a semantics in terms of partial assignments, following the original set-up in [8].
Denition 27 ( Semantics of DRT)
M; f j= ? never
M; f j= Pt1    tn i h[[t1]]Mf ; : : : ; [[tn]]Mf i 2 PM
M; f j= :D i there is no g with M; f; g j= D
M; f; g j= F I
C1   Cn i
f : F ! dom(M);
g : F [ I ! dom(M);
M; g j= C1; : : : ;M; g j= Cn:
Denition 28 (DRT Consequence)
F I
C1   Cn j=
F [ I I 0
Cn+1   Cm
i for all M; f; g with M; f; g j= F I
C1   Cn
there is an h with M; g; h j= F [ I I
0
Cn+1   Cm .
A DRT calculus along similar lines as the calculus for DPL above is give in Figure 2 (lists C1   Ck
abbreviated as C). The calculus uses substitution in constraints and DRSs. This notion is dened by:
[t=v] Pt1    tn := P [t=v]t1    [t=v]tn;
[t=v]
F I
C1   Cn :=
F I
[t=v] C1    [t=v] Cn
Of course, when a substitution [t=v] is mentioned in a rule, it is assumed that t is free for v in D. It
is also assumed that all DRSs mentioned in the rules satisfy the syntactic wellformedness conditions
for DRSs.
Note that the counterpart to variable refreshment, marker refreshment, is not among the rules of the
DRT calculus. Marker refreshment is the following rule:
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F1 fvg [ I1
C1
=) F2 I2
C2
F1 fwg [ I1
[w=v]C1
=) fwg [ F2 I2
[w=v] C2
It is easy to see that this is an admissible rule of the calculus, in the sense that adding the rule would
not change the set of valid DRT sequences. To see why this is so, note that a proof for
F1 fvg [ I1
C1
=) F2 I2
C2
can be transformed into a proof for
F1 fwg [ I1
[w=v] C1
=) fwg [ F2 I2
[w=v] C2
by simply changing appropriate occurrences of v to w.
Note that marker shift and sequencing left together give the following derived rule:
F1 I1
C1
=) F2 I2
C2
F1 − I0 I0 [ I1
C0 [ C1 =)
F2 I2
C2
Theorem 29 The calculus for DRT is sound.
Proof. Induction on the basis that the test axiom is sound and that the rules preserve soundness.
Here is one example soundness check, for the rule of marker introduction. Assume M; f; g; j= D.
Then by the soundness of the premiss, there is an h withM; g; h j= F I
[t=v] C
. Thus,M; h j= [t=v] C.
Since v =2 F , h0 given by h0(v) = [[t]]Mh , and h0(w) = h(w) for all w 6= v for which h is dened extends
g. By (an appropriate DRT version of) the substitution lemma, M; g; h0 j= F I
C
. This proves
D j= F I
C
. 2
Theorem 30 The calculus for DRT is complete.
Proof. Consider the following translation procedure from DRT to DPL:
? := ?
(Pt1    tn) := Pt1    tn
(:D) := :D
v1    vn vn+1    vm
C1   Ck

:= 9vn+1;    ; 9vm;C1 ;    ;Ck
Use this procedure to translate a DRT sequent D1 =) D2 to a DPL sequent D1 =) D2 . Note
that the translation maps valid DRT consequences to valid DPL consequences. Assume D1 j= D2.
Then D1 j= D2. By Theorem 25, D1 =) D2. Next, transform the proof of D1 =) D2 into one of
D1 =) D2 making use of the correspondences between the axioms and rules of the two calculi. 2
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8. A Further Variation
Here is a variation on dynamic predicate logic suggested by Albert Visser in [13]. Visser proposes the
following ‘prudent’ version of DPL. States are pairs (X; s) of a variable set X and an assignment s.
The semantics of prudent DPL is given by:
Denition 31 (Semantics of Prudent DPL)
(X; s)[[?]]M(Y; r) never
(X; s)[[9v]]M(Y; r) i (i) v 2 X ^ (X; s) = (Y; r); or
(ii) v =2 X ^X [ fvg = Y and s v r
(X; s)[[Pt1    tn]]M(Y; r) i (X; s) = (Y; r) and h[[t1]]Ms ; : : : ; [[tn]]Ms i 2 PM
(X; s)[[:()]]M(Y; r) i (X; s) = (Y; r)
and there is no (Y 0; r0) with (X; s)[[]]M(Y 0; r0):
(X; s)[[A;]]M(Y; r) i there is an (X 0; s0)
with (X; s)[[A]]M(X 0; s0) and (X 0; s0)[[]]M(Y; r):
(X; s)[[:(1);2]]M(Y; r) i (X; s)[[:1]]M(X; s)
and (X; s)[[2]]M(Y; r):
Here the set of ‘activated’ variables is incorporated in the relational semantics. This set is used in the
semantic clause for the existential quantier. In case variable v has already been activated before, 9v
does nothing.
Semantic consequence for prudent DPL gets dened as  j=  i for all models M, all assignments
s; r and the variable set X with (;; s)[[]]M(X; r) there are (X 0; r0) with (X; r)[[ ]]M(X 0; r0).
The semantic change gets reflected in the calculus as follows:
 The restriction v =2 x(T ) on test-quantier swap (from T ; 9v to 9v;T ) is removed.
 The two quantier contraction rules get replaced by:
; 9v C =)  
 C =)  v 2 intro()
 =) C19v C2
 =) C1 C2 v 2 intro(C1)
 The rule of variable refreshment is removed from the calculus. (This rule is not sound for the
prudent semantics.)
It can be proved that this modied calculus is sound and complete for prudent DPL, and the fact that
the modied calculus is a simplication of the original can be taken as a point in favour of prudent
DPL.
9. Related Work
The present approach to axiomatising dynamic predicate logics derives from a calculus for dynamic
reasoning without variables [6] where variables have been replaced by De Bruyn indices (familiar
from implementations of lambda calculus), and destructive assignment is replaced by a stack push
operation. Such a variable free approach to dynamics has clear advantages over the destructive
dynamics of variable assignment if one is interested in incrementality of updates.
An alternative to the present calculus is given in unpublished work by Frank Veltman [12]. Veltman
analyses a more baroque version of DPL, where a distinction is made between the ‘text connective’ ;
and the ‘sentential connective’ ^. Their semantic interpretations are the same; the dierence between
them resides in a syntactic restriction on the text connective to the eect that it cannot be outscoped
by negation. Also, in Veltman’s system free text variables are forbidden on the grounds that these
are hard to analyse in terms of partial variable assignments.
Veltman’s central notion of substitution is dened for variables that are ‘free in  after  ’. In our
terminology, an occurrence of v in  is free in  after  if v 2 x() and v =2 intro( ) both hold.
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Because Veltman’s calculus does not have our division of labour between introduction and elimination
rules on one hand and shift rules on the other, the introduction and elimination rules have rather
involved side conditions. Veltman suggests that completeness of these rules can be proved by means
of a syntactic tour through a variety of equivalent tableaux calculi, but [12] contains only a very
sketchy roadmap for carrying this out.
The calculus for DRT given in Section 7 demonstrates how keeping track of both the set of xed
discourse referents and the set of introduced discourse referents of a DRS engenders a considerable
simplication of previous calculi for DRT (see e.g. [9, 10]). The approach is very much in the spirit of
Visser [13].
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